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The United States Supreme Court declared Missouri's rules govern-
ing lawyer advertising unconstitutional in one of the state's most-discussed
cases of the year: In re RMJ.1 The author of this Article was counsel for the
appellant in that case and argued against the validity of those rules before
the Supreme Court. This Article discusses that decision, the events leading
up to it, the background of decisions against which it was decided, and its
implications for the future of lawyer advertising in Missouri.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Bates Decision
OnJune 27, 1977, the United States Supreme Court stunned the legal
profession with its decision in Bates v. Arizona,2 holding that an absolute pro-
hibition of advertising by lawyers violates the first amendment. In earlier
* Professor of Law, St. Louis University. A.B., 1942, Princeton Universi-
ty; J.D., 1948, University of Michigan. The author was the arguing counsel for
appellant RMJ in the case of In re RMJ. Professor Blackmar was recently appointed
to the Missouri Supreme Court.
1. 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
2. 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). See generally Canby, Commercial Speech of Lawyers:
The Court's Unsteady Course, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 401 (1980).
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decisions the Court had extended first amendment protection to commer-
cial speech, 3 but the most recent had expressly excluded lawyer advertising
from its scope. 4 Many lawyers had hoped that rules prohibiting such adver-
tising would be upheld. They were disappointed.
The particular advertisement before the Court involved a "legal clinic"
organized by two recent law graduates, advertising routine legal services
at fixed prices. The Court decided that the "overbreadth" doctrine did not
apply to commercial speech, 5 and so it examined the entire advertisement
to determine whether each item was protected. The Court found that the
following items in the Bates advertisement were "protected speech' ":6
(1) the listing of routine services and fees;
(2) the use of the term "legal clinic" to describe the operation;
(3) the statement that the office charged "very reasonable
prices";
(4) the prominent slogan, "Need a lawyer," and the logo of
the scales of justice.
The Court found no evidence that these items were "untruthful" or
"misleading" and concluded that they were therefore protected. 7
The Court emphasized that all regulation of lawyer advertising was not
foreclosed and expressly indicated that advertising having a potential for
harm might be regulated.8 It referred to "restrained" advertising, without
elaboration, and suggested that it would approve:
(1) prohibition of untruthful or misleading advertising;
(2) regulation of advertising that touts the quality of legal ser-
vices, since it can be misleading;
(3) requirement of a limited disclaimer;
(4) regulation of solicitation in person;
(5) reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions;
(6) special rules dealing with the electronic media. 9
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, made it clear that he would
uphold the general proposition that lawyers could advertise but dissented
because he felt that price advertising, even of routine legal services, was in-
herently misleading.10 ChiefJustice Burger also indicated that an absolute
3. See Linmark Associates v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); Virginia
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975). See generally Symposium on Commer-
cial Speech, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 389 (1980).
4. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 773 (1976).
5. 433 U.S. at 381.
6. Id. at 384.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 383.
9. Id. at 383-84.
10. Id. at 391 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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prohibition on advertising would not long survive, but he wanted to give
the bar authorities the opportunity to formulate their own regulations.I' Only
Justice Rehnquist took the firm position that commercial speech in general,
and lawyer advertising in particular, were not entitled to first amendment
protection.
1 2
B. The Bar Reaction
The Arizona rules invalidated in Bates were based on the American Bar
Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility and had their
counterparts, with minor variations, in almost all American jurisdictions. 3
As the Chief'Justice's dissent in Bates shows,' 4 the ABA was engaged in studies
looking toward relaxation of the absolute ban on advertising. No proposal
for doing so had ever passed the House of Delegates, however, and many
lawyers remained firmly opposed to lawyer advertising in any form. When
it became apparent that the Bates opinion would be handed down before the
summer recess, the ABA's Board of Governors authorized formation of a
Task Force on Lawyer Advertising. When the Court's decision was an-
nounced, quick action was necessary. OnJuly 25, 1977, the Task Force an-
nounced two proposals.' 5
Proposal A, representing a conservative approach to advertising, listed
twenty-five items that could be included in printed advertising. 1 6 The list
11. Id. at 386-88 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13. See L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND
SOLICITATION 2-6, 97 n. 14 (1980).
14. 433 U.S. at 386 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
15. Task Force on Lawyer Advertising, American Bar Association, Report
to Board of Governors (Aug. 4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report],
reprinted in L. ANDREWS, supra note 13, at 91.
16. The provisions of Proposal A important to this discussion are as follows:
DR 2-101 Publicity.
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate
in the use of any form of public communication containing a false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim.
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by
potential consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broad-
cast, subject to DR 2-103, the following information in print media
distributed or over television or radio broadcast in the geographic
area or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in
which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that
the information disclosed by the lawyer in such publication or broad-
cast complies with DR 2-101(A), and is presented in a dignified
manner:
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional
associates; addresses and telephone numbers;
1982]
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(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm prac-
tices, a statement that practice is limited to one or more fields
of law, or a statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes
in a particular field of practice, to the extent authorized under
DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal
courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and other
scholastic distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching positions;
(10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments in bar
associations;
(11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
(12) Technical and professional licenses;
(13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional associa-
tions and societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly
represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer
participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are
accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for an initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees and/or
an estimate of the fee to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(0), provided that the
statement discloses whether percentages are computed before
or after deduction of costs;
(23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement discloses
that the specific fee within the range which will be charged will
vary depending upon the particular matter to be handled for
each client and the client is entitled without obligation to an
estimate of the fee within the range likely to be charged, in print
size at least equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth
the fee information;
(24) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total
fee charged will depend upon the number of hours which must
be devoted to the particular matter to be handled for each client
and the client is entitled without obligation to an estimate of
the fee likely to be charged, in print size at least equivalent to
the largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of which
4
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would not be misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the
statement discloses that the quoted fee will be available only
to clients whose matters fall into the services described and that
the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate
of the fee likely to be charged in print size at least equivalent
to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information.
(C) Any person desiring to expand the information authorized for
disclosure in DR 2-101(B), or to provide for its dissemination through
other forums may apply to [the agency havingjurisdiction under state
law]. Any such application shall be served on [the agencies having
jurisdiction under state law over the regulation of the legal profes-
sion and consumer matters] who shall be heard, together with the
applicant, on the issue of whether the proposal is necessary in light
of the existing provisions of the Code, accords with standards of ac-
curacy, reliability, and truthfulness, and would facilitate the process
of informed selection of lawyers by potential consumers of legal ser-
vices. The relief granted in response to any such application shall
be promulgated as an amendment to DR 2-101(B), universally ap-
plicable to all lawyers.
(H) This rule does not prohibit limited and dignified identification of a
lawyer as a lawyer as well as by name:
(1) In political advertisements when his professional status is ger-
mane to the political campaign or to a political issue.
(2) In public notices when the name and profession of a lawyer are
required -or authorized by law or are reasonably pertinent for
a purpose other than the attraction of potential clients.
(3) In routine reports and announcements of a bona fide business,
civic, professional, or political organization in which he serves
as a director or officer.
(4) In and on legal documents prepared by him.
(5) In and on legal textbooks, treatises, and other legal publications,
and in dignified advertisements thereof.
DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads and Offices.
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not use or participate in the use of profes-
sional cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letter-
heads, or similar professional notices or devices, except that the
following may be used if they are in dignified form:
(2) A brief professional announcement card stating new or changed
associations or addresses, change of firm name, or similar mat-
ters pertaining to the professional offices of a lawyer or law firm,
which may be mailed to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal
friends, and relatives. It shall not state biographical data except
to the extent reasonably necessary to identify the lawyer or to
explain the change in his association, but it may state the im-
mediate past position of the lawyer. It may give the names and
dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line of succession. It
1982] 625
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was taken bodily from existing DR 2-102(A)(6),1 7 which set out the items
approved for inclusion in "reputable law lists" designed for circulation within
the profession. 18 Proposal B19 confined itself to a general prohibition on
shall not state the nature of the practice except as permitted under
DR 2-105.
DR 2-103 Recommendation of Professional Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-101(B), recommend
employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner or
associate to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding
employment of a lawyer.
Task Force Report, supra note 15, reprinted in L. ANDREWS, supra note 13, at 102-09
(footnotes omitted).
17. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(A)(6)
(1976) (amended 1977).
18. There was a question as to whether Proposal A embodied the only permitted
subject matter for lawyer advertisements. If so, inclusion of anything not on the
list would lead to discipline. Such a construction was inconsistent with Bates, which
required examination of each item to see if it was untruthful or misleading. In his
opinion in In re RMJ, Justice Powell suggested that the items listed in Proposal A
(by then partially embodied in DR 2-101(B)) be construed as a "safe harbor," per-
mitting the advertising of certain things without fear of challenge, while other adver-
tising matter could be questioned by the authorities. 102 S. Ct. at 933 n.4. This
approach had been implicitly rejected by the Missouri Supreme Court in its deci-
sion below. In re RMJ, 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 929
(1982). See also Carter v. Lovett & Linder, Ltd., __ R.I. -, 425 A.2d 1244
(1981); In re Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn.
1977); Task Force Report, supra note 15, reprinted in L. ANDREWS, supra note 13,
at 92. For cases holding that the "exclusive" construction is constitutiofially in-
firm under Bates, see Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp.
1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982); Durham v.
Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
19. The portions of Proposal B germane to this discussion are:
DR 2-101 Publicity and Advertising.
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate
in the use of any form of public communication containing a false,
fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement or claim.
(B) Without limitation, a false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive
statement or claim includes a statement or claim which:
(1) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact;
(2) Omits to state any material fact necessary to make the state-
ment, in the light of all circumstances, not misleading;
(3) Is intended or is likely to create an unjustified expectation;
(4) States or implies that a lawyer is a certified or recognized
specialist other than as permitted by DR 2-105;
(5) Is intended or is likely to convey the impression that the lawyer
is in a position to influence improperly any court, tribunal, or
other public body or official;
6
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(6) Relates to legal fees other than:
(a) A statement of the fee for initial consultation;
(b) A statement of the fixed or contingent fee charged for a
specific legal service, the description of which would not
be misunderstood or be deceptive;
(c) A statement of the range of fees for specifically described
legal services, provided there is a reasonable disclosure of
all relevant variables and considerations so that the state-
ment would not be misunderstood or be deceptive;
(d) A statement of specified hourly rates, provided the state-
ment makes clear that the total charge will vary according
to the number of hours devoted to the matter;
(e) The availability of credit arrangements; and
(f) A statement of the fees charged by a qualified legal
assistance organization in which he participates for specific
legal services the description of which would not be
misunderstood or be deceptive; or
(7) Contains a representation or implication that is likely to cause
an ordinary prudent person to misunderstand or be deceived
or fails to contain reasonable warnings or disclaimers necessary
to make a representation or implication not deceptive.
(C) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate
in the use of any form of public communication which:
(1) Is intended or is likely to result in a legal action or legal posi-
tion being asserted merely to harass or maliciously injure
another;
(2) Contains statistical data or other information based on past per-
formance or prediction of future success;
(3) Contains a testimonial about or endorsement of a lawyer;
(4) Contains a statement of opinion as to the quality of the services
or contains a representation or implication regarding the qual-
ity of legal services which is not susceptible of reasonable
verification by the public;
(5) Appeals primarily to a layperson's fear, greed, desire for
revenge, or similar emotion; or
(6) Is intended or is likely to attract clients by use of showman-
ship, puffery, self-laudation or hucksterism, including the use
of slogans, jingles or garish or sensational language or format;
or
(7) Utilizes television until [the agency havingjurisdiction under
state law] shall have determined that the use of such media is
necessary in light of the existing provisions of the Code, ac-
cords with standards of accuracy, reliability and truthfulness,
and would facilitate the process of informed selection of lawyers
by potential customers of legal services.
DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads, Offices and Law Lists.
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not use or participate in the use of a pro-
1982] 627
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misleading advertisements without detailed specifications of items approved
for advertising. The House of Delegates approved Proposal A.
Since Bates had involved newspaper advertising, neither proposal dealt
with direct mail advertising. DR 2-102(A)(2) of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, adopted by Missouri and most other states, limited
mailings to announcements of the opening or relocation of law offices or the
association of new lawyers and permitted the mailing of announcements only
to "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends and relatives." 20 In light
fessional card, professional announcement card, office sign, let-
terhead, -telephone directory listing, law list, legal directory listing,
or a similar professional notice or device if it includes a statement
or claim that is false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive within the
meaning of DR 2-101(B) or that violates the regulations contained
in DR 2-101(C).
DR 2-103 Recommendation or Solicitation of Professional Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not seek by direct mail or other form of personal con-
tact and shall not recommend employment as a private practitioner
of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not
sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer, or assist another
person in so doing, except that if success in asserting rights or defenses
of his clients in litigation in the nature of a class action is dependent
upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept employment from
those he is permitted under applicable law to contact for the purpose
of obtaining theirjoinder. This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit
a lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with
him or his firm from requesting referrals from a lawyer referral ser-
vice operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association or from
cooperating with any other qualified legal assistance organization.
DR 2-105 Limitation of Practice.
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as, or imply that he is,
a recognized or certified specialist, except as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent
and Trademark Office may use the designation "Patents,"
"Patent Attorney," or "Patent Lawyer," or any combination
of those terms, on his letterhead and office sign. A lawyer
engaged in the trademark practice may use the designation
"Trademarks," "Trademark Attorney," or "Trademark
Lawyer," or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead
and office sign, and a lawyer engaged in the admiralty prac-
tice may use the designation "Admiralty," "Proctor in Ad-
miralty," or "Admiralty Lawyer," or any combination of
those terms, on his letterhead and office sign.
Task Force Report, supra note 15, reprinted in L. ANDREWS, supra note 13, at 123-33.
20. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(A)(2)
(1979).
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/2
LAWYER AD VER TISING
of Bates, it is difficult to see how a rule that purported to set out the only per-
mitted addressees could stand. The Bates Court, by referring to special prob-
lems of the electronic media,2 1 could be understood as indicating that any
regulation of media had to support expressly a substantive state interest.
Nothing in Bates indicates that the justices sensed any particular problem
in mailed advertising, but in 1981 thirty-eight states had rules prohibiting
general lawyer advertising by mail.2 2 Most of these rules, including
Missouri's, remained in pre-Bates form. 23
Most of the states that considered the problem of advertising after Bates
expressed a preference for the Proposal A form of regulation.2 4 Many of these
adopted Proposal A with modifications, the effect of which was to further
restrict the right to advertise. Several published opinions indicated judicial
preference for Proposal A. 25 None of these, however, discussed the ques-
tion of how the rule should be construed nor the issue of direct mail
advertising.
C. The Missouri Reaction
Since 1974, the Missouri Supreme Court has had a Standing Commit-
tee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, composed of well-known
lawyers and judges.2 6 Immediately after Bates, the court asked the Committee
to consider rule revisions. The Committee worked diligently and, on
September 9, 1977, submitted a report to the court. This report was con-
sidered and approved by the Board of Governors of the Missouri Bar. No
public hearings were held and there is no indication that constitutional opin-
ions or other outside input were sought. The report was not circulated to
the bar generally or released to the public, either before or after the court
acted on it.
In the meantime, several lawyers had taken it upon themselves to adver-
tise, assuming that Bates entitled them to do so. Some of the advertisements
followed the Bates model closely, while others were individually composed.
Those whose advertisements came to the attention of the General Chair-
man of the Advisory Committee 27 received letters from him, advising that
21. 433 U.S. at 384.
22. L. ANDREWS, supra note 13, at 136-45.
23. The text of DR 2-102(A)(2) was not changed in Proposal A. See Task Force
Report, supra note 15, reprinted in L. ANDREWS, supra note 13, at 106.
24. See Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court's New Rules on Lawyer Advertis-
ing: Some Practical, Legal, and Policy Questions, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 509 (1978). See also
L. ANDREWS, supra note 13, at 136-46.
25. See In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 263 Ark. 948, 963 (1978); In re Rule of Court
Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Tenn. 1978).
26. Its members at this time were practicing lawyers Robert L. Hawkins, Jr.,
Chairman, David Blanton, Meredith B. Turner, Forest M. Hemker, R. Leroy
Miller, Bertram W. Tremayne, Jr., Martin J. Purcell, andJ. Andy Zenge, Jr.,
andJudgesJames Ruddy and Donald L. Mason. SeeIn re RMJ, 609 S.W.2d at 411.
27. The Advisory Committee is established under Missouri Supreme Court
629
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they violated the existing Missouri rules, which were substantially the same
as the Arizona rules held invalid in Bates.28 He suggested that they wait un-
til the Missouri Supreme Court amended its rules, which, he advised them,
it was in the process of doing. He was unwilling to recognize Bates as hav-
ing the immediate effect of permitting advertising that complied with its
specifications. Some of the lawyers who received letters replied by saying
that they had the right to advertise under Bates and would continue to do so. 29
In promulgating its new rules, the Committee on Ethics proceeded on
the assumption that, even after Bates, legal advertising remained a matter
that required the permission of the regulatory authorities. The Committee
studied the Bates Court's reservation about advertising in the electronic media
and concluded that no such advertising should be permitted "at this time. "30
It noted that the Missouri Supreme Court was undertaking a study of legal
specialization and decided that it should make no further recommendations
regarding advertising of specialties.31 No attention was given to mailed adver-
tising because Bates did not deal specifically with it.
The Committee's report shows a disposition to keep a tight lid on lawyer
advertising. It described Bates as the decision of a "narrow majority," 32 a
characterization which, considering the variety of views expressed by the
dissenters, is not accurate. The Committee expressed a definite preference
for Proposal A but recommended that the list of twenty-five sanctioned items
be cut to nine. 33 It felt that the shortened list contained all of the essential
information a prospective client might need and was adequate to inform the
public about the availability and cost of routine legal services. 34 The report
suggested that the Missouri Supreme Court delegate to the Advisory Com-
mittee the authority to designate "fields and areas of law" that might be
used by a lawyer in advertising and to list the "routine legal services" for
which prices could be advertised.3 5
The Missouri Supreme Court substantially adopted the Committee's
report in an order dated October 24, 1977.36 The new rules were to be ef-
fective January 1, 1978. A tenth category of permitted advertising was added,
allowing lawyers to say that "credit arrangements for the collection of fees
Rule 5.03. It has a full-time, compensated General Chairman and supervises mat-
ters of professional ethics, unauthorized practice of law, and disciplinary
proceedings.
28. See In re RMJ, 102 S. Ct. at 932 n. 1. Several lawyers advised the author
that they had received similar letters.
29. At least two lawyers, who requested anonymity, so advised the author.
30. Committee on Professional Ethics and Responsibility, Missouri Bar Ass'n,






36. See 33 J. MO. B. 497 (1977).
630 [Vol. 47
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will be given consideration." ,37 The court did not invite participation by other
interested parties and issued no opinion or advisory memorandum. The new
rule was published in December 1977.38
The Advisory Committee immediately began work on the task assigned
it by the court, and in November 1977, it issued an Addendum to the new
DR 2-101(B), effective January 1, 1978.39 The Addendum allowed alawyer
to adopt certain general designations: "General Civil Practice," "General
Criminal Practice," or "General Civil and Criminal Practice." 40 Choos-
ing one of those designations precluded the listing of additional areas of prac-
tice. As an alternative, the Addendum allowed a lawyer to list any one or
more fields of law from an approved list of twenty-three fields. 41 A lawyer
who listed the fields had to state, "Listing of the above areas of practice does
not indicate any certification of expertise therein. "42 The Addendum com-
manded sternly, "No deviation from the above phraseology will be permitted
and no statement of limitation of practice can be stated." 43 It was published
in the Journal of the Missouri Bar early in 1978, 44 and, asJudge Seller noted
in his later dissent from the Missouri Supreme Court decision, was available
in no other source of general reference. 45 The Advisory Committee issued
no report or memorandum explaining why it approved certain fields for
listing while excluding others.
The list of permissible fields had several remarkable features. There was
no limit on the number of fields a lawyer could list, so long as he confined
himself to the approved list and used the specified language. There was no
requirement that a lawyer have any experience in the fields he chose to list.
The Advisory Committee's choice of fields follows no consistent pattern.
It cannot be said that the fields listed are simply the normal or routine areas
of practice, since such items as "Anti-Trust Law," "Environmental Law,"
"Financial Institutions Law," and ''International Law" are listed 46 while
fields such as "Securities Law" and "Social Security Law" are not listed
in any form.
The Addendum was subsequently amended to substitute "Negligence
Law" for "Tort Law," and "Domestic Relations Law" for "Family
Law. 47 The amendment, like the Addendum, was apparently published
37. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 2-101(B)(9).
38. 33 J. Mo. B. 497 (1977).





44. 34J. Mo. B. 51 (1978).
45. 609 S.W.2d at 415 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
46. See 34 J. MO. B. 51 (1978) (adopted at Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR
2-101(B)(5)).
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only in the Journal of the Missouri Bar. 48
There were wholesale violations of the new rules, as they were later con-
strued by the Missouri Supreme Court, from their inception. Nonconform-
ing advertisements appeared in the St. Louis and Kansas City telephone
directories 49 and in newspapers and other periodicals. These violations con-
tinued through subsequent directories, even after the bar's disciplinary
machinery began to operate.
5 0
One lawyer filed an action in the Circuit Court ofJackson County, seek-
ing a declaration that he had a constitutional right to advertise the fact that
he practiced "Social Security Disability Law." 51 The petition was resisted
by the Advisory Committee on the ground that there was no actual contro-
versy until the advertisement had been published; the court sustained a mo-
tion to dismiss.52 The court's holding meant that a lawyer could not obtain
a test of the rule except by putting his license on the line.
Another lawsuit was filed protesting the total prohibition on radio and
television advertising, but it was dismissed by the plaintiff before any deci-
sion was rendered.5 3 The rules would not be tested until someone decided
to violate them and submit to disciplinary action.
II. THE CASE OF RMJ
RMJ 54 was admitted to the bars of Missouri and Illinois in 1973. After
working in Washington, D.C., part of the time as an attorney for the
Securities and Exchange Commission, he opened his own office in Clayton,
Missouri, in 1977.
A. RMJ's Advertising
To announce the opening of his new office, RMJ mailed the usual
"tombstone" announcements, which his wife helped him address. His wife
was active in a civic organization and used its roster to obtain the addresses
48. Id.
49. See In re RMJ, 609 S.W.2d at 415 n. 1 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
50. There is no public record of disciplinary proceedings before those taken
in the case of RMJ. In no other case was a public information filed by the Advisory
Committee or by any Circuit Bar Committee. Since informal contacts by the Ad-
visory Committee or other bar committees are secret, and formal hearings are also
secret until an information is filed in court, MO. SUP. CT. R. 5.22, details of other
enforcement efforts are unavailable.
51. Gann v. Missouri Bar Ass'n Advisory Comm., No. CV 78-3779 Uackson
County Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 1979).
52. Id.
53. This suit was disclosed in the remarks of Harold W. Barrick, General
Chairman of the Missouri Bar Advisory Committee, at the formal hearing in the
RMJ case, April 19, 1979.
54. The Missouri Supreme Court, in its opinion in the case, decreed that the
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of those in the organization whom she knew. Two announcements were.
mailed to a St. Louis County couple that RMJ apparently did not know.
RMJ stated that the announcements were sent to the couple because his wife
thought she was acquainted with the wife. He regarded the addressees of
his announcements as "acquaintances," which he considered synonymous
with the word "friends" in DR 2-102(A)(2). 55
RMJ also advertised in newspapers. He did not follow the Bates model
but designed his own format. No charges for specific services were listed.
One advertisement in a periodical brought the General Chairman's
customary letter, asserting noncompliance with the rules and suggesting that
RMJ wait until the new Missouri rules became effective.5 6 RMJ responded
that his advertising was proper under Bates and asked that the format be
approved. 57 The General Chairman replied, after some delay, that the pro-
posed advertisement was a violation of the new rules.5 8
At the time he first heard from the General Chairman, RMJ had con-
tracted for advertising in the Yellow Pages of the St. Louis Suburban
Telephone Directory and in a suburban newspaper. These advertisements
contained no disclaimer of expertise since the contracts had been signed in
November 1977, and the Addendum requiring the disclaimer was not
published until January 1978. 59 RMJ stated that he tried to stop publica-
tion after he learned of the disclaimer requirement but was unable to do so.
60
The Advisory Committee summoned him to an informal hearing, which
was held on May 22, 1978.61 He was questioned about the two announce-
ments received by the-St. Louis County couple and about advertisements
that had appeared in newspapers and the Yellow Pages.6 2 About ten months
published opinion should carry only the initials of the respondent. In re RMJ, 609
S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
55. Stipulation 16, Appellant'sJurisdictional Statement at A-25, In re RMJ,
102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
56. Letter from Harold W. Barrick, General Chairman, Missouri Bar Ad-
visory Committee, to RMJ (Nov. 8, 1977).
57. Letter from RMJ to Harold W. Barrick, General Chairman, Missouri
Bar Advisory Committee (Nov. 15, 1977).
58. Letter from Harold W. Barrick, General Chairman, Missouri Bar Ad-
visory Committee, to RMJ (Dec. 19, 1977).
59. See 34J. MO. B. 51(1978).
60. See 609 S.W.2d at 415-16 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
61. A transcript of the informal hearing is on file with the Clerk of the Missouri
Supreme Court. The discussion that follows is taken from that transcript.
62. RMJ appeared at the hearing without counsel and was questioned ag-
gressively and critically. The committee members went into detail about the fields
of law he listed and his experience in those fields. To the suggestion that he was
claiming the right to substitute his judgment for that of the state's highest court,
RMJ replied that he considered that Bates gave him the right to advertise. Transcript
of Informal Hearing before Missouri Bar Advisory Committee (May 22, 1978).
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later, RMJ was summoned to a formal hearing before the Advisory Com-
mittee. The notice set out four charges, which were substantially identical
with the four counts of the information that was eventually filed. 63 The author
of this Article appeared as counsel for RMJ at the formal hearing, 64 which
was held on April 19, 1979. 65
The atmosphere at the formal hearing was not unfriendly. 66 Presenta-
tion of the Committee's evidence was facilitated by stipulations. RMJ
testified and was questioned by members of the Committee. The General
Chairman took the firm position that the Committee had no authority to
consider the validity of the rules or the Committee's own Addendum; he
asserted that the deliberations were confined to deciding whether there was
probable cause to believe that the violations charged in the notice had
occurred.
RMJ requested and was granted permission to file a post-hearing brief
discussing the constitutional questions involved. Additional arguments raised
in the brief were that DR 2-101(B) should be considered a "safe harbor,"
indicating items that would not be challenged by disciplinary authorities but
not an exclusive list of permitted advertising statements, and that the inci-
dent involving the two mailed announcements was de minimis and should
not be considered in further proceedings. Counsel for the Advisory Com-
mittee filed no response.
RMJ and his counsel decided to litigate the case in the Missouri courts. 67
63. The items which had been considered at the informal hearing were the
subjects of Counts I, II, and III. Count IV was based on an advertisement in the
St. Louis Yellow Pages, August 1978, which appeared after the informal hearing.
64. The representation was arranged by the American Civil Liberties Union,
which also sustained the substantial expenses of the continuing litigation.
65. Although not provided for by the Missouri Supreme Court Rules, see Mo.
SUP. CT. R. 5.13(e), a return was filed to the Notice of Formal Hearing in order to
show that the constitutional question had been raised at the earliest opportunity.
66. A transcript of the formal hearing is on file with the Clerk of the Missouri
Supreme Court.
67. Serious consideration was given to the filing of a declaratory and injunc-
tive action in the United States District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). If
such an action were filed, the prevailing party would have the opportunity to recover
costs and attorneys' fees. See id. § 1988. An obstacle might have been presented by
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971), which held that federal courts should
usually decline to proceed with cases raising constitutional challenges to criminal
statutes if state proceedings are pending, especially since formal proceedings had
already been commenced. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2515 (1982), indicates a strong preference for allowing lawyer
disciplinary matters to proceed in state court even though federal constitutional ques-
tions are presented, "[slo long as the constitutional claim. . . can be determined
in the state proceedings and so long as there is no showing of bad faith, harrass-
ment or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstinence inap-
propriate." Id. at 2523. In Middlesex County, the state supreme court had made it
634 [Vol. 47
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/2
LAWYER AD VER TISING
One reason for this decision was the recent holding of the Missouri Supreme
Court that publication and dissemination of a "divorce kit" could not be
enjoined, 68 which led counsel to consider that the court was sensitive to first
amendment rights in the area of legal advertising.
On September 17, 1979, the General Chairman advised RMJ that the
Advisory Committee had found probable cause to believe that there had been
violations of all four counts of the notice. The advice was coupled with the
rather chilling suggestion that further proceedings could be avoided if the
respondent would surrender his license. 69 RMJ, responding to that heavy-
handed approach, replied that the constitutional arguments were advanced
in good faith and in the belief that they were meritorious, that the case was
designed to test the validity of the rules, and that it would be highly inap-
propriate to seek disbarment as a remedy. 70 The response contained an of-
fer to waive formal service and to submit to the jurisdiction of the Missouri
Supreme Court. The General Chairman replied that discipline was a mat-
ter for the court's discretion and that the information would be in the usual
form.
7 1
Counts I, II, and IV of the information dealt with advertising in the
print media. 72 Count I involved an advertisement in the January-February
1978 issue of West End Word, a free newspaper distributed in the St. Louis
area. The information alleged that the advertisement violated DR 2-101(B)
by listing the courts before which RMJ was admitted to practice and areas
of law not approved for advertising purposes and in failing to include the
required statement disclaiming certification of expertise in those areas. Count
II made identical charges with regard to an advertisement in the Yellow Pages
of the St. Louis Suburban West Telephone Directory in February 1978.
Count IV involved the Yellow Pages for August 1978 but dropped the
disclaimer violation.
The advertisements that were the subject of Counts I, II, and IV con-
tained the statements, "Admitted to Practice Before THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT," and "Licensed in: MISSOURI &
clear, after federal proceedings were instituted, that it would accept an interlocutory
appeal raising federal constitutional questions. Id. at 2524 n. 15. The case provides
some guidance for lower federal courts in an uncertain area. Because of the Ad-
visory Committee's position that it would not consider constitutional questions,
however, it is possible that a federal court would have accepted jurisdiction in RMA.
68. In re Thompson, 574 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Mo. 1978).
69. Letter from Harold W. Barrick, General Chairman, Missouri Bar Ad-
visory Committee, to the Author (Sept. 17, 1979).
70. Letter from the Author to Harold W. Barrick, General Chairman,
Missouri Bar Advisory Committee (Sept. 18, 1979).
71. Letter from Harold W. Barrick, General Chairman, Missouri Bar Ad-
visory Committee, to the Author (Sept. 20, 1979).
72. The advertisements in question were attached as an appendix to the
Supreme Court's opinion in the case. 102 S. Ct. at 940.
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ILLINOIS.' '73 These were charged as violations because they were not ex-
pressly authorized by the rules. The remaining portion of the charge, relating
to the fields of law specified, can best be illustrated by the August 1978 adver-
tisement that was the subject of Count IV. The advertisement listed twenty-
three areas of law, the same number authorized by the Addendum. Four
of these were listed in the language of the Addendum, 74 while nine were
Addendum-authorized fields but in somewhat different language. 75 Eight
fields had no counterpart in the Addendum. 76
Count III involved the mailing of the two announcements to the St..Louis
County couple with whom RMJ was unacquainted. No claims were made
that any of the advertisements violated the "misleading" advertising stan-
dard of DR 2-101(A).
B. Proceedings in the Missouri Supreme Court
Even before the information was filed, RMJ filed a motion in the
Missouri Supreme Court asking that proceedings be held in camera and
without disclosing his name. The Advisory Committee opposed the motion
and it was summarily denied without opinion. 77 The information then
became a public document, but there was no substantial publicity attend-
ing the start of proceedings.
RMJ filed a return, setting forth the same constitutional questions that
had been presented to the Advisory Committee along with an offer to sub-
mit the matter directly to the court on the record made before the Commit-
tee. The court indicated that, for it to accept the case directly, a stipulation
of all facts would be required. 78 A stipulation was agreed to, with numerous
exhibits, and this became the record for further proceedings in the case. The
case then stood for briefing and oral argument in the manner of an appeal,
with the Advisory Committee having responsibility for filing the initial brief.79
The Committee's opening brief simply set forth facts condensed from
the stipulation and quoted Bates to the effect that some regulation of lawyer
73. The courts to which RMJ was admitted were set in all capital letters and
were, next to his name, the most prominent feature of the advertisements. Id.
74. The four areas were "Bankruptcy," "Anti-Trust," "Labor," and
"Criminal." Id.
75. E.g., "Tax" instead of "Taxation Law," "Corporate" instead of"Cor-
porate Law and Business Organizations," "Real Estate" instead of "Property
Law," "Personal Injury" instead of "Tort Law." See id. at 934 n.8.
76. These areas included "Contracts," "Aviation," "Securities-Bonds,"
"Pension-Profit-Sharing," "Zoning and Land Use," "Entertainment/Sports,"
"Communications," and "Food, Drug and Cosmetics." Id. at 940.
77. In re RMJ, No. 62,821 (Mo. Jan. 15, 1980).
78. Letter from Clerk of the Missouri Supreme Court to the Author (Feb. 19,
1980).
79. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 84.24.
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advertising is permitted so long as it is reasonable. The brief did not offer
a reasoned constitutional justification for the Missouri rules. 0
The respondent's initial brief asserted that all of the advertisements were
constitutionally protected speech, and that an absolute prohibition on direct
mail advertising also violated the first amendment. 81 It was argued that the
80. Informant's Opening Brief, In re RMJ, 609 S.W.2d 411 (1981).
81. The respondent's "Points Relied On," which are an essential part of the
brief in Missouri, see Mo. SUP. CT. R. 84.04(c), were as follows:
I. The respondent has the constitutional right to publish newspaper and
"Yellow Pages" advertisements listing the courts in which he is admitted
to practice, and DR 2-10 1(B) is unconstitutional to the extent that it pur-
ports to forbid this publication.
a. The right to publish statements which are truthful, not misleading,
and not self-laudatory is guaranteed by Article I of the Constitution of the
United States.
b. DR 2-101(B) should not be construed so as to forbid the publication
of all advertising matter which is not specifically listed in its ten subsections.
II. The respondent has the constitutional right to list the areas of the
law in which he holds himself out as available for rendering of legal ser-
vices, and DR 2-101(B) is invalid to the extent that it purports to forbid
this publication.
a. DR 2-101(B) constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power
to the Advisory Committee.
b. The Advisory Committee Addendum deprives persons in the posi-
tion of the respondent of freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First
Amendment, in forbidding the listing of fields of law not set out specifically
in the Addendum, and in requiring adherence to the exact language of the
Addendum.
c. DR 2-101(B)(2) should be construed so as to sustain its
constitutionality.
d. DR 2-101(B) has been applied by the Advisory Committee in an ar-
bitrary and capricious manner, in that the Addendum does not permit the
listing of proper fields of law.
III. The respondent should not be disciplined on account of the omis-
sion of a disclaimer of expertise in the advertisements which are the sub-
ject of Counts I and II of the Information.
a. The advertisements were contracted for in good faith, prior to the
promulgation of the Advisory Committee Addendum.
b. The disclaimer provisions of the Advisory Committee Addendum
cannot validly be applied to the respondent (i) because six months' notice
of the amendment to DR 2-101(B) was not given; (ii) because DR 2-101(B)
contains an invalid delegation of legislative power; and (iii) because the
delegation of power is limited to the authorization and approval of fields
of law, and does not authorize the requirement of a disclaimer.
IV. The respondent should not be subject to discipline on account of
his wife's having mailed an announcement, on two occasions, to a couple
which did not recall any acquaintance, (a) because the sending of a factual
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Addendum was based on an invalid delegation of the supreme court's
rulemaking power to the Advisory Committee, since no standards were set
for the Committee's rulemaking and no findings were required as condi-
tions precedent to its determinations. 82 The brief also presented the "safe
harbor" argument, asserting that the amended rules should be construed
so as to make them constitutionally. valid.
The Committee filed a reply brief, accompanied by copies of the lawyer
advertising rules of most states. The brief took the firm position that any
advertisement that included matter not specifically authorized by the rules
constituted a violation.8 3 It took issue with RMJ's claim that the first amend-
ment protected all legal advertising that was truthful and not misleading,
except to the extent that it was regulated by a narrowly drawn rule passed
to further a substantial government purpose. The brief argued instead that
the rule should be upheld if it represented a reasonable regulation of lawyer
advertising. As proof of reasonableness, the Committee pointed to the rules
of numerous other states, based on ABA Proposal A.8 4
Two important events occurred between the scheduled date of the in-
itial hearing and the date later set. 85 The first was the United States Supreme
announcement in the mail is protected speech under Bates and (b) because
the evidence shows no intent to violate any rule.
a. Under Bates, a lawyer has the constitutional right to use the mails
for announcing the opening of his office, and his right to do this is not con-
fined to persons he knows.
b. The incident described in Count III, as shown by the stipulated facts,
is trivial and not likely to recur, and for that reason should not be the basis
of discipline.
V. Even if the court upholds all or any part of the existing rules, no
discipline should be assessed against the respondent.
Respondent's Brief at 5-6, In re RMJ, 609 S.W.2d 411 (1981).
82. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429-32 (1936).
83. The points in the Committee's reply brief were as follows:
I. Rule DR 2-101(B) restricting advertising by lawyers is not unconstitu-
tional. Insofar as it does not permit listing the courts in which a lawyer,
in this case Respondent, is permitted to practice, and restricts the areas
of law to which the lawyer may restrict his practice, it is not violative of
the lawyer's First Amendment rights of free speech. The Disclaimer Pro-
vision is proper.
II. The part of Rule DR 2-101 (B) restricting the persons to whom direct
mailing can be made is valid and not violative of respondent's First Amend-
ment right of free speech.
Informant's Reply Brief at 3-4, In re RMJ, 609 S.W.2d 411 (1981).
84. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
85. The case was initially set for argument in June 1980. Several days before
the date set, counsel for the Committee spoke to the Chief'Justice of the Missouri
Supreme Court about problems encountered in filing a reply brief, and the court
continued the case until fall.
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Court's decision in Central Hudson Gas &Electric Company v. New York Public
Service Commission,86 which sought to establish guidelines for the regulation
of commercial speech. The Court established a four-part test for such regula-
tions, including the requirement that the regulation be "not more exten-
sive than necessary to serve" a substantial government interest. 87 The Court
also declared that regulations of commercial speech must be "narrowly
drawn." '88 If the invalidity of the Missouri rules had not been clearly
demonstrated by Bates, Central Hudson should have cleared up any doubts.
The decision was available at the time the Committee's reply brief was filed
but was not discussed in that brief.
The second development involved a St. Louis lawyer, Arnold T. Phillips,
Jr., against whom investigations were commenced both by the local Bar
Committee and by the Advisory Committee. Phillips had circulated an adver-
tisement by mail to commercial firms, informing them of his availability for
collection matters and setting forth his rates. He was challenged for that mail-
ing and an informal hearing was noticed. The Advisory Committee also
raised questions about a newspaper advertisement in which he described
provisions of the bankruptcy laws and suggested that they might provide
a source of relief for persons in financial distress. The advertisement was
Phillips's own composition and was, of course, not covered by the express
listings of DR 2-101(B).
The bankruptcy advertisement presented a new dimension in lawyer
advertising. RMJ's printed advertisements were simple displays, saying in
effect, "Here I am. This is what I do." The Phillips advertisement sought
to inform the public about a legal remedy, the availability of which might
not have been generally known. If the Advisory Committee's position were
correct, informative advertising would be absolutely prohibited, and the
public would receive only "spartan fare." 89 If Phillips-type advertisements
could be prohibited, then first amendment protection for lawyer advertis-
ing would be slight indeed.
Phillips filed two federal actions, one in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri9" based on the mailed advertising, and
86. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
87. Id. at 566. The test articulated by the Court is as follows:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provi-
sion, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next,
we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regula-
tion directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it
is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
88. Id. at 565.
89. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 367.
90. Phillips v. Schmidt, No. 80-0684-C(1) (E.D. Mo. filed May 28, 1980).
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one in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri9'
based on the bankruptcy advertisement. Neither proceeded to final adjudica-
tion. The judge in the Eastern District denied a temporary restraining
order, 92 while the Western District judge first suggested proceedings before
the Advisory Committee, then advised Phillips to attempt to intervene in
the RMJ proceedings. The suggestion was accepted and leave to appear
amicus curiae was obtained. Phillips filed a brief containing a detailed
analysis of Central Hdson and a compilation of state statutes on court rules
with official citations. Central Hudson was also discussed in detail in RMJ's
reply brief.93
On the day set for oral argument, RMJ was the last case on the calen-
dar. The judges questioned the parties aggressively. 94 To a statement of the
Committee's counsel that it was not particularly seeking disbarment, Judge
Donnelly asked whether disbarment should not follow for willful violation
of the court's rules; before the proceedings were concluded, however, he
stated that he would not vote for disbarment on the record before him. Judge
Morgan asked whether freedom to advertise the areas of the law practiced
would not interfere with pending proposals to license and certify specialists.
Judge Rendlen asked about the effect of advertising on the "professionalism"
of lawyers. Counsel for Phillips argued that "times have changed," and the
old norms no longer applied. Because of the very detailed questioning, the
court allotted the respondent's counsel extra time.
The court's opinion, handed down December 15, 1979, came as an anti-
climax after the detailed briefing and thorough oral argument. Delivered
by Judge Donnelly, with the concurrence of Judges Rendlen, Morgan,
Welliver, and Higgins, the opinion took notice of the Central Hudson deci-
sion and went on to state:
We are urged now by the respondent to follow the Central Hud-
son model. We respectfully decline to enter the thicket of attempt-
ing to anticipate and to satisfy the subjective ad hocjudgments of a ma-
jority of the justices of the United States Supreme Court....
We recognize respondent's right to press on in the courts
authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution. If he ex-
ercises that right and obtains a favorable result there, we can then
decide whether we will honor our duty to exercise "superintending
control over all courts" in Missouri... or will order DR 2-101 ex-
cised from Rule 4 of this Court. 95
The court noted that the case was a test case and that the violations were
91. Philips v. Barrick, No. 80-4114-GV-C(5) (W.D. Mo. filed May 20, 1980).
92. Phillips v. Schmidt, No. 80-0684-C(1) (E.D. Mo. June 2, 1980).
93. Respondent's Reply Brief at 15-16, In re RMJ, 609 S.W.2d 411 (1981).
94. The Missouri Supreme Court records oral arguments for the court's use,
but the transcripts are not public information. The details of the court's question-
ing are supplied from the recollections of the author.
95. In re RMJ, 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1980).
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minimal. The respondent was privately reprimanded and ordered to pay
the costs of the proceeding. 6
Judge Donnelly's opinion is similar to some of the concurring, partially
concurring, and dissenting opinions he wrote in other constitutional cases. 9
7
Other members of the court, however, had not previously joined in those
opinions. The court's opinion in RMJdid not respond to some matters raised
in the briefs: (1) whether the respondent was found in violation of all, or
only some, of the counts; (2) the question of advertising through the mails;
(3) the point about invalid delegation of rulemaking power; (4) whether the
items listed in the rule were the only items that could be used or were merely
examples; and (5) whether RMJ could be punished for failing to include
the disclaimer before the Addendum was adopted.
ChiefJustice Bardgett andJudge Seiler filed separate dissenting opin-
ions which, as Justice Powell subsequently wrote, "reflect a thoughtful ex-
amination of the charges made against appellant." 98 Bardgett expressed
doubt that all the ramifications of Central Hudson applied to lawyer adver-
tising, but he felt that DR 2-101(B) should be construed as setting forth ex-
amples of proper advertising rather than as establishing exclusive subject
matter. 99 Seiler felt that Central Hudson was applicable. 100 He was critical of
RMJ's advertising his membership in the bar of the United States Supreme
Court which, he suggested, was of minimal benefit to the public in select-
ing a lawyer and was used purely for promotional purposes, 10 1 but he felt
that RMJ was using protected speech in listing fields of law other than those
approved by the Advisory Committee, using words that varied from those
approved by the Committee, and advertising the states in which he was ad-
mitted to practice. 102 Seiler demonstrated at some length that RMJ had con-
tracted for the advertisements that were the subjects of Counts I and II before
he could have known of the Addendum, and that he tried to stop
publication. 10 The dissenting opinions played an important part in the later
United States Supreme Court review of the case by indicating, as the ma-
jority opinion failed to do, just what had been considered and decided by
the Missouri court.
96. Id. at 412.
97. See, e.g., State v. McCrary, 621 S.W.2d 266, 274 (Mo. 1981) (Donnelly,
J., concurring in result); Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Ins. Co., 601 S.W.2d 8, 9
(Mo. 1980) (Donnelly, J., concurring); Sours v. State, 593 S.W.2d 208, 223 (Mo.
1980) (Donnelly,J., dissenting); State v. Handley, 585 S.W.2d 458, 465 (Mo. 1979)
(Donnelly, J., concurring).
98. 102 S. Ct. at 935 n.9.
99. 609 S.W.2d at 414 (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 416 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Seiler, J., dissenting). Bardgett disagreed with Seiler's criticism of
the listing of Supreme Court admission. Id. at 414 (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 416 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 415 n. 1 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
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The majority opinion, at first blush, appeared to be in flagrant conflict
with both Bates and Central Hudson. The situation was compounded by the
Missouri court's action in virtually throwing down the gauntlet to the United
States Supreme Court. But there were problems in seeking review. If any
portion of the advertisement could be found to contravene a proper regula-
tion, it might support the mild disciplinary sanction imposed. Since the Bates
opinion had examined each part of the advertisement to see if protected
speech was involved, 104 it was possible that the sanction would have been
proper had any item in the advertisement been found not to be protected
expression. There were two other points of vulnerability: the failure to in-
clude the disclaimer in the first of the two advertisements, and the mention
of admission to practice before the United States Supreme Court.
RMJ moved for clarification. The Committee did not respond. The court
denied the motion summarily but stayed the effect of the decision pending
further review.1 0 5
III. IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. The Appeal
Since the case involved a constitutional challenge to state legislation'
0 6
and the decision of the highest state court was in favor of the validity of the
legislation, the United States Supreme Court had jurisdiction by appeal. 0 7
Notice of appeal was filed in the Missouri Supreme Court on January 9,
1981, and ajurisdictional statement was filed in the United States Supreme
Court in March 1981, raising the following "Questions Presented":10 8
1. Whether, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, a state may adopt and enforce a court rule listing the exclusive
categories of information which are permissible in lawyers' adver-
tisements in the printed media.
2. Whether, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, a state may discipline a lawyer for including in advertisements
the concededly accurate and non-misleading information, not ex-
104. 433 U.S. at 363-65.
105. It was necessary to at least attempt to get clarification because of the mat-
ters not discussed in the majority opinion. The United States Supreme Court is
reluctant to accept cases that are not "clean" or that have subsidiary issues that
might be sufficient to support the judgment. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 230-34 (5th ed. 1978). Even though the RMJcase was
an appeal, not a request for certiorari, the great majority of appeal cases are dis-
missed at the jurisdictional stage without argument. Id. at 318.
106. See Ohralik v. Ohio, 436 U.S. 477, 479 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 415 (1978); Bates, 433 U.S. at 352.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976).
108. "Questions Presented" are an essential part of the Supreme Court ap-
pellate process and must be set out before anything else in the brief. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 34. 1(a).
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pressly prohibited by rule, that he is licensed to practice in two states,
that he is admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the
United States, and that he practices in areas of law such as "per-
sonal injury," "contracts," and "securities and bonds," which
designations are not among those explicitly approved by the state
authorities.
3. Whether a state, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may
discipline a lawyer for publishing in a telephone directory which cir-
culates in adjoining states, the truthful information that he is licensed
to practice in both states.
4. Whether a state, consistent with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, may discipline a lawyer for mailing a simple an-
nouncement of the opening of his office to persons with whom he
is not acquainted, on the basis of a court rule limiting the mailing
of announcements to "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal
friends and relatives. "109
RMJ made a suggestion of summary reversal. The appellees did not
file a response within the allotted time. RMJ's counsel served a copy of the
jurisdictional statement on the Attorney General of Missouri, " 0 who declined
to participate. Phillips's counsel obtained the consent of both parties and
filed a brief amicus curiae prior to a ruling on jurisdiction.
The Court took the rather unusual step of requesting appellees to file
a response to the jurisdictional statement. There was some feeling that this
presaged summary reversal, with the Court perhaps reluctant to reverse
without having any argument from the appellees. On the other hand, the
Court may have wanted to give the appellees every opportunity to call its
attention to jurisdictional problems. The appellees responded with a brief
motion to dismiss on the ground that the constitutional question had not
been passed on by the court below. The issue was never ruled on expressly,
but in May 1981 the Court noted probable jurisdiction."'
The appellant's brief made essentially the same constitutional arguments
that had been presented to the Missouri Supreme Court" 2 and pointed out
that the constitutional questions had necessarily been resolved adversely to
him, as the decision below indicated.1 3 Appellees argued that (1) the
Missouri rules were "reasonable and . . . not more extensive than
necessary"; (2) there was no constitutional right to list courts of admission
and, particularly, admission to the bar of the United States Supreme Court;
(3) diversity rather than unity should be the rule in reviewing state provi-
sions regarding lawyer advertising; (4) regulatory rules should be subjected
109. Appellant'sJurisdictional Statement at i, In reRMJ, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
110. The Attorney General was served because of the Court's equation of court
rules with statutes. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (1976); FED. R. CIV. P. 28.4(c).
111. 453 U.S. 910 (1981).
112. See note 81 supra.
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to a "low level ofjudicial scrutiny"; and (5) the Missouri rules had the vir-
tue of certainty. 114 Heavy emphasis was placed on the rules of other states
which supported similar programs of regulation. Appellees also argued that
direct mail advertising could be prohibited because of its potential for
intrusiveness. 115
Two amicus briefs were filed in addition to the Phillips brief. The
American Trial Lawyers' Association filed a brief urging reversal and argu-
ing for wide latitude for truthful advertising, leaving it to the public to deter-
mine whether the factors set out in the advertisements were important. 1 6
The State Bar of Texas, on the other hand, set forth "horrible examples"
of lawyer advertising in that state. 1 7 It suggested that, since advertising by
lawyers in Texas was out of control, the Court might find it appropriate to
reconsider Bates at an early opportunity. The brief requested that, in the
meantime, the opinion in RMJ be framed in the narrowest possible terms
so as to avoid pronouncements on issues not explicitly before the Court." 8
114. Appellees' Brief at 3. The headings for the points raised in the appellees'
brief are as follows:
I. DR 2-101 of Rule 4 of the Missouri Supreme Court does not violate
the First Amendment right of free speech by restricting lawyer advertis-
ing only to those routine legal services and areas of practice listed there-
in ....
II. Appellant has no constitutional right to list in advertisements the
courts in which he is admitted to practice ....
III. The part of DR 2-102(A) of Rule 4 of the Supreme Court of
Missouri restricting the persons to whom direct mailing can be made is
valid and not violative of Respondent's First Amendment right of free
speech ....
IV. Although this Court is the final arbiter of First Amendment rights,
in areas of doubt concerning state regulation of lawyer advertising it should
defer to the states and leave the states in the traditional role of regulating
the conduct of lawyers within their boundaries. ...
Id. at 4.
115. Id. at 12.
116. Amicus Curiae Brief, American Trial Lawyers' Ass'n, at 10, In reRMJ.
117. Amicus Curiae Brief, State Bar of Texas, at 4-10, In re RMJ. Texas had
suspended enforcement of its rules governing legal advertising "to the extent they
conflict with Bates." L. ANDREWS, supra note 13, at 144, 146. There are no reported
cases involving any disciplinary action for advertising in Texas. Several of the adver-
tisements pictured in the amicus brief had to do with provisions of the bankruptcy
laws, just as Phillips's advertisements did. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra, at 12. There
have been quite a few complaints about this kind of advertising, but it may be that
those who complain are not sympathetic with the substantive provisions of the
bankruptcy laws and are reluctant to see anyone take advantage of them.
118. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 117, at 16.
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The case came up for oral argument on November 9, 1981. Appellant's
counsel was quickly besieged by questions. 119 Several justices asked per-
sistently whether there was any benefit to the public in indicating member-
ship in the bar of the United States Supreme Court. 120 There were ques-
tions about the advertising of a lawyer's past successes 12 1 and about the use
of the mails in solicitation.122 The justices also asked a great many questions
of appellees' counsel, some of which were very pointed. Much was made
of the requirement in the Addendum that "tort law" be stated instead of
"personal injury law,"1 23 as RMJ had used. There were complaints that
119. The official transcript does not designate the particular justice who asks
a question, and the justices' names are supplied from the memory of the author
and his associates. The first question came after appellant's counsel had spoken
only 43 words:
QUESTION [by Justice Rehnquist]: Well, Mr. Blackmar, as to the par-
ticular facts of this case, supposing we were to conclude that under Bates
the rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Missouri were unconstitutional.
Would we be free to roam at large beyond this particular rule and say that
A, B, C, D are permitted, but E, F, G are not?
Official Transcript of Oral Argument before United States Supreme Court at 3,
In re RMJ.
120. Id. at 12-14, 18-20, 32.
121. Justice Powell, for example, put it this way: "Would it be appropriate in
your view for a lawyer who practiced personal injury law to say that my average
verdicts over the past 12 months have been $129,000, assuming that is a fact?" Id.
at 8.
122. Justice Powell was concerned about possible abuses:
QUESTION: Mr. Blackmar, thinking about mail advertising, let's,
assume that a lawyer had access to the names of people who were admit-
ted to the emergency room of a great hospital in a large city. Could he use
that list of names to send invitations to come and see him when they got
well enough?
Id. at 11. Justice O'Connor also pressed the point:
QUESTION: Do you think that it would be proper and not subject to
state bar regulation for an attorney to send out letters to people who are
listed in the newspaper as being widows of recently deceased spouses, listing
an area of expertise or practice as representation of widows? Is that
something the State could not properly reach?
Id. at 20.
123. Justice Stevens interrogated appellees' counsel thoroughly on this point:
QUESTION: I think I may be troubled by something that Justice
O'Connor asked you. You are suggesting it could have been a better rule.
Tort isn't the most informative rule to describe a personal injury specialist,
or a medical malpractice specialist. But do you defend this rule as being
constitutional? Do you defend the judgment of the court below?
MR. INGLISH: Your Honor, yes, I do defend the rule.
QUESTION: You think it is adequate to say "tort" and forbid any other
word?
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the opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court was of little help, 124 and appellees'
counsel conceded that it was also of little help to him. 125 The proceedings
were surprisingly informal at times, the reporter on several occasions noting
"general laughter."
The Court recessed promptly at noon. Each side had about five minutes
left. When the proceedings resumed, neither side used the full time
remaining. 126
B. The Opinion
On January 25, 1982, the Missouri Supreme Court's judgment was
reversed outright in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Powell, who,
though among the dissenters in Bates,127 has been the Court's primary
spokesman in recent commercial speech cases. 128 The Court discussed the
Bates rules in general terms:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the
QUESTION: Yes, but he was disciplined because he did not use the
word "tort." Is that not correct?
MR. INGLISH: Well, yes, that is correct.
QUESTION: Now, do you defend that discipline?
MR. INGLISH: Yes, sir, I do, Your Honor.
QUESTION: So you really cannot rely on the fact that now they say
you can use the word "negligence."
MR. INGLISH: Well, no. That is true. It has been changed. But that
was only part of-
QUESTION: And do you not also agree that tort is by no means the
most informative word to describe that kind of practice?
MR. INGLISH: I would agree with that.
QUESTION: And yet you defend-
MR. INGLISH: But that is only one of the items, Your Honor.
QUESTION: No, but it is perhaps an important item to a large number
of people who would be using this kind of method of finding clients.
Id. at 30.
124. Id. at 32, 36-37, 42. The opinion noted that "the court did not explain
the reason for its decision." 102 S. Ct. at 936.
125. Appellees' counsel was being prodded by Justice Stevens:
MR. INGLISH: Unfortunately, Justice Stevens, the court below did
not tell us which of these items it was considering as violative of the rules-
QUESTION: It really didn't tell us very much, did it?
MR. INGLISH: They certainly did not. No, sir, Your Honor.
Official Transcript of Oral Argument before United States Supreme Court at 32,
In re RMJ.
126. The author had the distinct impression that the Court, at this point, had
heard all the argument it cared to hear.
127. See 433 U.S. at 391 (Powell, J., dissenting).
128. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. New York Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio, 436 U.S. 477 (1978); In rePrimus,
436 U.S. 412 (1978).
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/2
LAWYER AD VER TISING
protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular con-
tent or method of advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading
or when experience has proven that in fact such advertising is sub-
ject to abuse, the states may impose appropriate restrictions.
Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the states
may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially
misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the in-
formation also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.
129
The Court held emphatically that the Central Hudson rule is applicable to legal
advertising, observing: "Restrictions must be narrowly drawn, and the state
lawfully may regulate only to the extent that regulation furthers the state's
substantial interest.' '130
The opinion then examined each of the charged violations. The Court
noted that the constitutionality of the disclaimer was not challenged. It deter-
mined, with the aid of the dissenting opinions below, that the Missouri
Supreme Court had found violations of all four of the counts in the infor-
mation, including the one involving the Yellow Pages advertisement in which
the disclaimer had been included. 3 1
The restrictions on areas of practice that could be listed and the re-
quirements of specific descriptive language were held invalid because RMJ's
listing presented "no apparent danger of deception" and was not "shown
to be misleading"; the state suggested "no substantial interest promoted
by the restriction." 132 The Court agreed with ChiefJustice Bardgett's obser-
vation that RMJ's listings were, in some respects, more informative than
the Advisory Committee's.133
The Court also noted that the listing of states in which a lawyer is ad-
mitted to practice may be helpful and informative, especially in border areas.
It held that the Advisory Committee had shown no substantial public in-
terest in prohibiting such a listing. 34
The inclusion, in prominent letters, of RMJ's admission to practice
before the United States Supreme Court was, however, "somewhat more
troubling," as it "could be misleading to the general public unfamiliar with
the requirements of admission to the bar of this Court."1 35 Nevertheless,
the Court rejected that statement as a basis for discipline:
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the inclusion of this
information was misleading. Nor does the Rule specifically iden-
129. 102 S. Ct. at 937.
130. Id. at 939.
131. Id. at 938 n.18. The Court did not respond to appellant's assertion that,
if the disclaimer is proper, a lawyer should at least be allowed to explain that the
Missouri Bar does not certify specialists. It seems clear from the opinion, however,
that a truthful explanation could not be prohibited.
132. Id. at 938.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 938-39.
135. Id. at 939.
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tify this information as potentially misleading or, for example, place
a limitation on type or require a statement explaining the nature
of the Supreme Court bar. 136
The Court then dealt with the subject of direct mail advertising. 137 The
issue, a subordinate one, was raised only because the Advisory Committee
sought to discipline RMJ for the mailing of the two announcements. The
Missouri Supreme Court's opinion did not deal with the issue at all, but
the two dissenters had argued that the same advertisement that could be
published in a private medium could be sent through the mail.138 The Court
agreed that mailings or handbills might be more difficult to police than
published advertisements but noted that the state had not demonstrated its
inability to supervise mailings or that an absolute prohibition was the only
feasible method of regulation. 13
9
The opinion concluded with the observation that the states retain
substantial authority over lawyer advertising. It spoke favorably of narrowly
drawn rules designed to meet specific evils.' 40 It found the Advisory Com-
mittee's case deficient in its failure to demonstrate that the desired regulatory
goals could not be achieved by means short of total prohibition and that less
drastic means had been attempted without success.
14 1
The opinion is not expansive. It does not hold that all lawyer advertis-
ing is protected by the first amendment, even if it is truthful and not
misleading. It did not adopt the proposition, asserted by the appellant, that
the state could not prescribe the contents of protected speech.' 42 It did not
136. Id. The Court's concern, expressed both in oral argument and in the opin-
ion, is surprising. RMJ's statement was perfectly true. Over 100 St. Louis lawyers
listed admission to the bar of the United States Supreme Court in the 1981 edition
of the Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory, which is available in public libraries.
The Advisory Committee gave no indication that it was more concerned about this
statement than any other portion of RMJ's advertisement. The Committee, in its
reply brief in the Missouri Supreme Court, characterized the statement as
"puffing," but did not emphasize the point. The state court's majority opinion
made no comment about it. The first substantial criticism of the statement is found
in Judge Seiler's dissent. 609 S.W.2d at 416 (Seller, J., dissenting). The United
States Supreme Court's comments indicate that the statement might be misleading
and within the scope of the state's regulatory power. 102 S. Ct. at 938-39.
137. 102 S. Ct. at 939.
138. 609 S.W.2d at 414 (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting); id. at 416 (Seller, J.,
dissenting).
139. 102 S. Ct. at 939.
140. Id. The suggestion of "narrowly drawn rules" was first made in In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 417 (1978) (mail solicitation of legal business in noncom-
mercial setting). The proposition was cited with approval in Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Co. v. New York Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980).
141. 102 S. Ct. at 940.
142. See Howard, Going About Suppressing Speech: A Comment on In the Matter of
RMJ, 26 ST. LouIs U.L. REV. 328, 337 (1982).
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even hold explicitly that a lawyer must be expressly charged with publishing
misleading advertising if the regulatory authorities can show that it is, in
fact, misleading. The regulators have the burden of showing either that the
information in question is misleading or that there is substantial public in-
terest in restrictive requirements. 143
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The RMJ opinion deliberately emphasizes the state's power to regulate
lawyer advertising in the interest of protecting the public. The Court noted
that "the potential for deception and confusion is particularly strong in the
context of advertising professional services." 144 The opinion did not indulge
in extensive dicta about fact situations not present in the case, but it did in-
dicate that Bates is not to be read narrowly or grudgingly. Although the adver-
tising in question had no ambiguities or seriously controversial items, the
subject matter of the case is varied enough to give reliable guidance about
remaining problems in lawyer advertising, some of which have already been
drawn into litigation.
A. Misleading Information
Both Bates and RMJ emphasize the propriety of prohibiting misleading
advertising. The Court's substantial attention to and discussion of RMJ's
statement that he was admitted to practice before it is instructive. The state-
ment is pure fact, yet the opinion suggests that it could be misleading to
members of the public who do not realize how easy it is to gain admission.
145
The opinion recognizes, then, that even a true statement can be
misleading. 146 The problem of misleading advertising might be approached
in three possible ways.
First, a state could adopt a general prohibition of misleading advertis-
ing such as Missouri's DR 2-101(A).147 This would be sufficient to support
an information, but the regulatory authorities would have the burden of
demonstrating that a particular statement was misleading. A recent Wiscon-
143. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has so interpreted RMJ. In re Marcus,
Wis. 2d ., -, 320 N.W.2d 806, 815 (1982).
144. 102 S. Ct. at 937. See Carson, LegalAdvertising in Kansas: Expanding Marketing
of Legal Services, 21 WASHBURN LJ. 626 (1982); Young, Supreme Court Report, 68
A.B.A. J. 342 (1982).
145. 102 S. Ct. at 939.
146. The point is illustrated by Justice Marshall's tongue-in-cheek question
as to whether a young lawyer could advertise, "I have never lost a case!" Official
Transcript of Oral Argument before United States Supreme Court at 14, In reRMJ.
147. See generally Devine, LawyerAdvertising and the Kutak Commission: A Refreshing
Return to the Past, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 503, 513-14 (1982). RMJ was not charg-
ed with a violation of DR 2-101(A) and no issue of misleading advertising was tried
before the Advisory Committee or the Supreme Court.
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sin case, In re Marcus,148 holds that, under RMJ, the disciplinary authorities
have the burden of proving that an advertisement is misleading, and that
they cannot put that burden on the advertiser.149 In that case a law firm had
published advertisements containing subjective judgments about the ex-
perience of the lawyers and the reasonableness of the fees. A referee had found
the advertisements were not misleading. The court confirmed this finding
on the basis of its own evaluation of the evidence, holding that the infor-
mants had not sustained the burden of proof.1 50 The court reached this con-
clusion on the basis of statements in the RMJ opinion that a mere potential
to mislead does not justify a prophylactic rule if less restrictive measures could
correct the anticipated mischief,151 and that the regulatory authorities had
not established that the statements were misleading.15 2
Second, a state could adopt rules forbidding the use in advertising of
certain statements that the authorities have determined to be misleading.
The Supreme Court has sustained a Texas statute requiring that a practi-
tioner of optometry not use a trade name or the name of an optometrist who
is not present in the office. 153 New Jersey has just sustained a rule that for-
bids the use in law firm names of lawyers who are not present or past members
of the NewJersey bar. 154 Iowa has defined the term "legal clinic" and has
forbidden the use of this designation except by organizations meeting cer-
tain specifications. 155 The burden is on the state to show that truthful infor-
mation could be misleading, but if it meets this burden the objective truth
of the matter does not necessarily guarantee a right of publication.
Third, a state might adopt regulations, analogous to those of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, requiring the filing of all advertis-
ing matter with the regulatory authorities. 5 6 Those in authority could then
voice their objections or suggest additional material by way of explanation
or disclaimer. It might even be possible to require a short delay in order to
148. - Wis. 2d - , 320 N.W.2d 806 (1982).
149. Id. at -, 320 N.W.2d at 815.
150. Id. at _ , 320 N.W.2d at 815-16.
151. 102 S. Ct. at 937.
152. Id. at 938-39.
153. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1979).
154. In re Review of Opinion 475, 89 N.J. 74, -, 444 A.2d 1092, 1094
(1982), appeal dismissedfor want of substantialfederal question, 51 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S.
Nov. 1, 1982) (No. 82-139).
155. Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1227-28
(S.D. Iowa 1971), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982).
156. For a discussion of such regulation, see 2A WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
MANUAL §§ 2245, 2247, 2268 (M. Volz rev. 2d ed. 1977). When a registration state-
ment is filed it is examined by the SEC staff, which prepares a "deficiency letter"
with suggestions for additions or modifications. The registration statement in theory
becomes effective 20 days after filing, but in practice the registrant complies with
the staffs request for delays. The SEC has no power to delay effectiveness for more
than 20 days and may then seek a "stop order" if it believes that the statement does
not comply with the law.
[Vol. 47
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allow the regulators to discuss their objections with the advertiser or seek
injunctive relief. The imposition of such a delay, however, may bring the
problem of prior restraint into the case and create other problems.1 5 7 A more
reasonable approach to the problem would be for the regulatory agency to
invite prepublication submission.
The Court's comments about the advertising of admission to its bar in-
dicate that the term "misleading" will not necessarily be read narrowly or
technically and that prohibition could be imposed, or explanation required,
of statements that might be viewed in a false light. The Court would certainly
prefer required explanation to out-and-out prohibition.
B. Non-Misleading Information
The Supreme Court flatly rejected the Missouri approach, in which the
regulatory authorities decide what information might be helpful to the con-
suming public and forbid everything else. Lawyers have the first amend-
ment right to choose the method and content of their expression, so long
as it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. Restrictions must be
specific rather than general and must be supported by a substantial public
interest. The least restrictive means must be used, or at least tried.
Bates spoke in terms of "restrained" advertising. 158 This thought was
echoed in RMJ in the Court's remark that the mention of Supreme Court
admission was, at least, in "poor taste." 59 It might be possible for a state
to insist on certain standards of dignity. In an earlier case the Supreme Court
had refused to disturb a decision that allowed a rule against billboard adver-
tising to stand.160 In a case originating in Arkansas, the Court let disciplinary
action stand against lawyers who had purchased advertising in a book of dis-
count coupons.' 61 It might be a mistake to read too much into these denials
in view of the highly discretionary nature of the Court's certiorari power,162
157. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-59 (1965), requires that a speedy
judicial determination be available if exhibition of motion pictures is to be delayed
pending determination of obscenity. Rules of prior restraint are less strictly applied
in commercial speech cases, see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389-90 (1973), but an indefinite delay would surely
not be tolerated.
158. 433 U.S. at 372.
159. 102 S. Ct. at 939. The Utah Supreme Court dealt with the issue of digni-
ty in lawyer advertising in In re Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982).
Two justices questioned the "dignity" standard, but the majority upheld a pro-
hibition on "billboards, circulars, matchbooks and inscribed pencils and pens."
Id. at 995.
160. Calig & Waterman v. Supreme Court of Ohio, No. 79394 (OhioJune 8,
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979). For a description of the issues raised by
the case, see 48 U.S.L.W. 3243 (1979).
161. Eaton v. Supreme Court, 270 Ark. 573, 579-80, 607 S.W.2d 55, 59-60
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
162. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 105, at 353.
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but it can be said that the justices were not seriously disturbed by regula-
tions imposed on advertising that some might regard as undignified.
The state of Iowa adopted a series of specific regulations, some of which
prohibited the advertising of truthful matter. A federal district judge drew
a distinction between factual matter, which he said could not be misleading,
and promotional matter, which could. 163 The case held that a lawyer could
advertise the fact that he is black but could be prohibited from advertising
his personal opinions. 164 It is difficult to see how either of those could be
misleading.
The distinction between factual and promotional material is of doubt-
ful validity. As has been shown in the preceding section, even factual material
can be misleading. It is hard to see the substantial public interest in forbid-
ding the advertising of non-misleading items that, while they may have lit-
tle objective value in the selection of a lawyer, might possibly affect some
clients. Why should not a lawyer advertise, "I am a political conservative
and would be pleased to handle the legal problems of conservative people,
especially when they have problems with governmental regulation," if he
is so disposed and willing to suffer the loss of liberal clientele?
Both ABA Proposal A and Missouri's DR 2-101(A) prohibit self-
laudatory statements in advertising. The restriction's validity is open to ques-
tion, except to the extent that the information is misleading. Bates observed
that statements about the quality of legal services offered could be
misleading, 165 but statements that a lawyer is an Eagle Scout or an All-
American halfback, while perhaps self-laudatory, are hardly misleading. A
client who learned of these circumstances without the benefit of advertising
might be attracted to a lawyer because of them. It is hard to say that these
particular statements are in bad taste. Regulators would be well advised to
proceed cautiously unless the statements are potentially misleading.
A New Jersey case sustained the continued validity of DR 2-102(D),
a pre-Bates rule in effect in that state and elsewhere, which prohibits the listing
on a lawyer's letterhead of his qualifications in another profession. 66 The
petitioner was both a lawyer and a certified public accountant. He wanted
to list his accounting credentials on his professional stationery. The state-
ment was absolutely true, and it was not unrelated to his ability to practice
law. The court observed, uneasily, that "non-legal training is not directly
transferable to legal ability or prowess," and "the inclusion of extra-legal
qualifications on a letterhead creates a possibility of confusion that is suffi-
cient to sustain the constitutionality of restrictions on the place and man-
ner of the communication." 1 67 The rule, said the court, "does not purport
163. Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1227
(S.D. Iowa 1981), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982).
164. Id.
165. 433 U.S. at 383-84.
166. In re Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 447, 86 N.J.
473, 432 A.2d 59 (1981).
167. Id. at 479, 432 A.2d at 62.
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to close other avenues for the advertisement of such accomplishments." 168
The decision is strained and difficult to justify. It is difficult to see the public
interest in regulating the information that may be contained on a lawyer's
stationery if the forbidden information may be conveyed by other means.
If there is a difference of opinion as to the importance of an accounting cer-
tificate in the selection of a lawyer, the public should be the judge.
The RMJopinion did not discuss Phillips-type advertising, which pur-
ports to offer the public information about legal procedures and processes
that might be available to them. One who believed in advertising would argue
that such informative advertisements are beneficial to the public. Any fear
that this kind of advertising connotes a claim of particular expertise could
easily be corrected by a disclaimer. There is no public interest in prohibiting
advertising of this general character.
C. Listing of Areas of Practice
The Supreme Court has indicated that a listing of areas of practice is
"potentially misleading."1 69 Quite a few state authorities have shown similar
concern. But a valid regulation would have to be something different from
Missouri's provisions for listing only particular areas and using only par-
ticular words approved by the Advisory Committee.
State authorities have been concerned about unfounded claims of ex-
pertise or specialized knowledge. Tennessee took the position that any listing
of an area of practice or statement of limitation of practice, other than a listing
of charges for routine legal services, amounted to a claim of special skill.
The state prohibited such listings except for the long recognized specialties. 170
A federal district court, in an opinion that showed remarkable anticipation
of the Central Hudson holding, held the rule invalid.171 The judge observed
that a statement of limitation of practice, far from being a claim of special
skill, might simply indicate that the lawyer did not claim to be current or
competent in areas not listed.172 But Rhode Island cases, state and federal,
have upheld similar rules. 173
Another aspect of the problem is presented by listings in classified
telephone directories of lawyers, arranged by area of practice. A federal court
rejected NewJersey's efforts to regulate such listings, 174 but the Montana
168. Id. at 4,80, 432 A.2d at 62.
169. 102 S. Ct. at 937.
170. In re Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638,
644-45, 653 (Tenn. 1977). Cf In re Amendment of Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, 267 Ark. 1181, 1182-83, 590 S.W.2d 2, 3-4 (1979).
171. Durham v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213, 225 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
172. Id. at 223 n.16. Thejudge used the analogy of a veterinarian who wanted
to treat only dogs and cats because he had no practical experience in treating farm
animals.
173. Lovett& Linder, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903, 911-12 (D.R.I. 1981);
Carter v. Lovett& Linder, Ltd., __ R.I. ..,, 425 A.2d 1244,1246 (1981).
174. Princeton Community Phone Book v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 710-11 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978).
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Supreme Court, in a case in which the telephone company was a party, held
the listings improper because of the implication of special ability.' 75 The
presence of a general disclaimer at the top of each page was held insufficient
as a means of protection.1 76 A New York case upheld the discipline of a lawyer
who listed himself under more than twenty separate headings when he ad-
mitted that he lacked experience in some of those areas.1 77 The Mississippi
Supreme Court, in a post-RMJ case, struck down a rule forbidding all
classified advertising other than the attorney's name, firm name, address,
and telephone number. 78
The prohibition of listing of areas of practice appears to be invalid under
RMJ. One may sympathize with a lawyer who feels he must buy multiple
directory listings in order to keep up with the competition, but Bates arguably
shows little sympathy for the goal of protecting lawyers from expense. 79
There is an anomaly in granting a lawyer a general license to practice law
just as soon as he passes the bar examination, and then telling him that he
cannot tell the public about the areas in which he holds himself out to prac-
tice. A disclaimer requirement should be sufficient to protect the public
against unjustified claims of expertise.
If the state chooses to certify specialists, it may of course take steps to
keep uncertified lawyers from claiming certification. It might even be per-
missible to require that the words "not certified" be included by uncertified
lawyers who hold themselves out as willing to handle matters in fields in which
certification is available.
D. Mailed Advertising
The Supreme Court's treatment of mailed advertising in RMJ came as
a surprise to many. The ABA Task Force had not even seen the need for
revising DR 2-102 after Bates. Yet the decision was not surprising. Two state
courts of last resort, when presented with the issue, held emphatically that
the same advertisement that could be published in a newspaper could be
sent through the mail,1 8 0 and the Supreme Court agreed. The Court found
that the public interests in privacy' 8' and the policing of advertising'8 2 could
175. In re Mountain Bell Directory Advertising, -Mont..... , 604
P.2d 760, 763 (1979).
176. Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 764.
177. Zimmerman v. Office of Grievance Committee, 79 A.D.2d 263,
438 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (1981), appeal dismissed, 440 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1981).
178. McLellan v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 705, 708 (Miss. 1982).
179. See 433 U.S. at 377-78.
180. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978); Koffler
v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 149,412 N.E.2d 927, 929, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872,
877 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981).
181. In re RMJ, 102 S. Ct. at 939 n.20. The note suggests that fears about receiv-
ing a letter from a lawyer could be allayed by a requirement that the words "this
is an advertisement" appear on the envelope. See Consolidated Edison v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (letter is not serious invasion of privacy).
182. In reRMJ, 102 S. Ct. at 939. See Foley v. Alabama State Bar, 481 F. Supp.
654 [Vol. 47
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be satisfied by regulation far short of total prohibition of direct mail
advertising.
RMJpresented the issue of mailed advertising in its simplest form. The
mailing, an announcement of the office opening, was not a direct solicita-
tion, since the lawyer had no reason to believe that the addressees had any
current legal business. As a result, the opinion left some unanswered ques-
tions about the promotion of legal services by mail.
In a pre-RMJ New York decision, the Appellate Division considered
the case of a lawyer who mailed 7500 circulars to people who were assumed
to be selling their homes, advising them of his charges for legal services in
connection with the sale; the court found that the lawyer had engaged in
improper solicitation rather than protected advertising.18 3 The New York
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the circular was protected speech
and that the distinction between advertising and solicitation, in the context
of the case, was "artificial."184
The Florida Supreme Court took a different view in an opinion handed
down shortly before RMJ was argued. A lawyer wrote to an international
trading company, suggesting that the company "might" have need of a
lawyer familiar with immigration law and offering his services.18 5 The court
held that this was solicitation, which could be regulated. 8 6
In another pre-RMJ decision, the New York Court of Appeals departed
from its earlier position, holding that a lawyer violated valid state statutes
by sending circulars to a large number of real estate brokers, advising them
of his charges for representing buyers and suggesting that they refer
customers to him for legal services. 187 The Appellate Division had found the
lawyer subject to discipline,188 and the Court of Appeals affirmed.189 It found
that the rule was a proper "time, place and manner" regulation and that
there was a substantial public interest in regulation because of a potential
conflict of interest. The court surmised that a lawyer who depended on real
estate brokers for his business might be disposed to pass on unmeritorious
titles so that the sale would go through and the broker would get his com-
1308, 1311-12 (N.D. Ala. 1979), rev'don other grounds, 648 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1981).
183. Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 70 A.D.2d 252, 271-72, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560,
573 (1979).
184. Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 143, 412 N.E.2d 927, 929,
432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (1980).
185. Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 1981). The case was
remanded for further disciplinary proceedings and so probably is not final for pur-
poses of United States Supreme Court review.
186. Id. at 597.
187. Greene v. Grievance Committee, 54 N.Y.2d 118, 120-21, 429 N.E.2d 390,
391, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883, 884 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1738 (1982).
188. In re Greene, 78 A.D.2d 131, 133, 433 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854 (1981).
189. 54 N.Y.2d at 121, 429 N.E.2d at 391,444 N.Y.S.2d at 884. After the Ap-
pellate Division opinion but before the case went to the Court of Appeals, the lawyer
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mission. The court held that a "third party mailing" could be prohibited,
even though the advertisement would be proper and protected if published
in a newspaper or mailed directly to the purchaser.1 90
A petition for certiorari was filed,' 91 but it was denied with four justices
dissenting. 92 This in itself is surprising, since four votes are usually suffi-
cient for a grant of certiorari,193 but it is possible that the intervening suspen-
sion of the lawyer for incapacity might have rendered the case moot or
unripe. 1 94 Denial of certiorari, of course, does not connote approval of the
state court's decision.
The New York court's decision is absurd, as the dissent demonstrates. 195
The lawyer simply made his availability known. It is not unusual for a real
estate buyer to ask the seller's broker to recommend a lawyer, because often
buyers are not local people and know no local lawyers. The bare recommen-
dation has never been thought to raise an impermissible conflict of interest.
The lawyer is responsible for acting professionally. The potential for con-
flict of interest is certainly not increased if he sends a simple announcement
to a real estate broker who is a stranger to him, advising of his availability
and charges. A contrary holding of the Kentucky Supreme Court is
sounder. 1 96
None of the cases just discussed deals with the solicitation of employ-
ment in a particular pending matter. A protected advertisement is not con-
verted into an improper solicitation simply because it is addressed to peo-
ple who might have need for legal services. 197 There is no reason to force
lawyers to fire expensive broadsides in order to avoid the charge of solicita-
tion. If advertising in general is beneficial, it is only sensible to allow the
information to be targeted to those who have use for it.
There is a more substantial problem if a lawyer makes use of a written
communication to try to procure a particular and known piece of legal
business. Two pre-RMJ cases hold that such attempts are not protected
speech. 198 The Supreme Court's opinion in Ohralik v. Ohio'99 held that out-
and-out "ambulance chasing" was not protected. The Court held that while
190. Id. at 125-27, 429 N.E.2d at 394, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
191. Certiorari was requested even though the fact that a state statute was
challenged and was upheld by the highest state court might have provided the basis
for direct appeal.
192. 102 S. Ct. 1738 (1982).
193. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 105, at 346-50.
194. The Supreme Court is not bound by the state court's decision on the issue
of mootness. Id. at 886. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 506 (1961).
195. 54 N.Y.2d at 129-36, 429 N.E.2d at 396-400, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 889-93
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
196. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978).
197. Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d at 145-47, 412 N.E.2d at 930-31, 432 N.Y.S.2d at
875-76.
198. In Allison v. Louisiana Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489, 496 (La. 1978), in-
volving a proposal for group legal services, the court found a violation of the solicita-
656 [Vol. 47
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face-to-face conversations are within the general protection of the first amend-
ment, the elements of intrusiveness and the potential for overreaching
justified prophylactic rules. 200
The Supreme Court has commented on the difference between a mail-
ing and a face-to-face confrontation, but in a case that did not involve com-
mercial speech. 20 1 The Ohralik case gave a graphic description of the dangers
of person-to-person solicitation. 20 2 It is hard to see how any letter could have
such serious potential. Perhaps, however, the Court overwrote in Ohralik,
so that the states may have some power to regulate abject mail solicitations.
E. Media Regulation
RMJ emphatically rejected the Advisory Committee's argument that
prohibition or severe restriction on the use of the malls in lawyer advertis-
ing was permissible as a "time, place and manner" restriction. 20 3 The
holding makes it clear that there must be a substantial public policy reason
behind any restriction of the particular advertising medium. It is not suffi-
cient to argue that alternate channels of communication are available. Follow-
ing RMJ, for example, the Utah Supreme Court amended its rules to allow
advertising in all "public commercial media.' '204
We have already considered the validity of advertising in media such
as billboards, 20 5 which some might consider lacking in dignity. The same
argument might be made about the use of handbills, 20 6 but it is difficult to
see why a lawyer should not be able to deliver announcements of the open-
ing of his office to people in his neighborhood, office building, or shopping
center without incu'rring substantial postage expense.
tion rules. There was a concurrence which expressed grave reservations. Id. at
496-98 (Tate, J., concurring). Compare Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff
v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 427-28, 393 A.2d 1175, 1181 (1978), appeal dismissed, 442
U.S. 907 (1979), a case decided on narrow principles, where lawyers terminating
their employment with a firm solicited clients of the firm for future business.
199. 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978).
200. Id. at 457, 467-68.
201. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 435-36 (1978).
202. 436 U.S. at 467.
203. 102 S. Ct. at 939. For a discussion of such restrictions, see Police Depart-
ment v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Time, place, and manner restrictions must
be "content neutral" and must be based on a substantial public interest. Id. at 99.
204. See In re Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991, 995 (1982).
205. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 13, at 51 (19 jurisdictions clearly prohibit
lawyers' billboards).
206. See Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1230
(S.D. Iowa 1981) (prohibition on handbills is a valid "manner" regulation in the
interest of minimizing commercialization), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir.
1982). It is difficult to see why a lawyer who opens an office in a suburban mall
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The remaining problem is the validity of restrictions or prohibitions of
radio and television advertising. The issue of television advertising was
presented obliquely in a case from New Jersey,20 7 one of the relatively few
states that forbid television advertising. In the case before it, the state supreme
court dealt with a requirement that firm names contain only the names of
lawyers licensed in New Jersey. The nationally advertised firm of Jacoby
& Myers, neither of whom was licensed in New Jersey, wanted to open an
office in the state. The firm, in full compliance with the local rules, adver-
tised on New York television stations whose signals reached into New
Jersey. 20 8 The court was unwilling to say that local lawyers could not advertise
their affiliation with Jacoby & Myers but saw that this would give those
lawyers an unfair advantage since other NewJersey lawyers could not adver-
tise on television. The court solved the problem by holding that local lawyers
could not advertise their affiliation so long as Jacoby & Myers continued
their New York television advertising. 209 The court then referred the en-
tire matter of television advertising to a committee for further study. It seems
clear that the court was worried that the television ban would not survive
further scrutiny.
In Bishop v. Board of Professional Ethics, 210 a United States District Court
upheld the Iowa restrictions on television advertising, including the require-
ment that advertisements be presented by a single non-dramatic voice, not
that of the lawyer, and without background sound. The plaintiff wanted to
show a conversation between a lawyer and a layman and to have his part-
ner, who was black, appear on television. The court held that the regula-
tions were reasonable. 211 The holding at this point can be contrasted with
the holding in another part of the case that the lawyer had the constitutional
right to advertise in the print media that his partner was black. 212
It can confidently be predicted that the total prohibition of radio or televi-
sion advertising cannot stand. The notation in the Bates opinion of the
"special problems" of the electronic media remains, 2 3 and this suggests that
restrictions on those media may be valid while similar restrictions on other
media might not. The Bishop court so held.
V. THE MISSOURI RESPONSE
After theRMJ opinion was handed down, the Missouri Supreme Court
entered an order suspending the enforcement of some of its advertising
207. In re Review of Opinion 475, 89 N.J. 74, 444 A.2d 1092 (1982), appeal
dismissedfor want of substantialfederal question, 51 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1982)
(No. 82-139).
208. Id. at _ , 444 A.2d at 1099.
209. Id. at _ , 444 A.2d at 1099-1100.
210. 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (S.D. Iowa 1981), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278
(8th Cir. 1982).
211. Id. at 1228-29.
212. Id. at 1226-27.
213. 433 U.S. at 384.
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rules.2 14 There remained the important protection of DR 2-101(A), which
forbids advertising that is "false, fraudulent, deceptive, self-laudatory or
unfair. ',215 That rule was never challenged.
In the court's order conforming to the mandate, however, the suspen-
sion was extended to cover all portions of the advertising rules, including
the ban on solicitation.2 16 The reason for the blanket suspension is hard to
fathom. The RMJ opinion took pains to emphasize that the states retain
substantial authority to regulate lawyer advertising. 217 The total suspension
gave carte blanche to lawyer advertising except to the extent that it violates
general rules forbidding "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation," 218 and "conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice." 219
OnJuly 2, 1982, the Missouri Supreme Court appointed another com-
mittee on lawyer advertising. As part of the same order, it lifted the total
suspension of advertising rules and adopted rules as follows:
DR 2-101. Publicity.
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm use or participate
in the use of any form of public communication containing a
misleading statement or claim.
(B) If a lawyer advertises a fee for a service, the lawyer must
render that service for no more than the fee advertised. 220
The new rule appears to meet all of the standards of validity under Bates and
RMJ. If additional regulation of advertising is recommended, it should be
based on a careful analysis of the constitutional requirements and should
have a substantial purpose apart from merely imposing a damper. Models
are available and should be used. 22 1
The Missouri Supreme Court should also provide a procedure for rais-
ing constitutional challenges to advertising rules in some manner that does
not involve discipline. NewJersey has a procedure forjudicial review of its
214. Order of February 5, 1982 (suspending enforcement of DR 2-101(B), DR
2-101(D), DR 2-103).
215. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 2-101(A).
216. ChiefJustice Donnelly was quoted as saying, "We won't enforce the rules
until we come up with other rules." Lawscope, 68 A.B.A. J. 407 (1982).
217. 102 S. Ct. at 932.
218. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 1-102(4).
219. Id., DR 1-102(5). See Calkins, Legal Advertising and Solicitation, 38J. Mo.
B. 199, 208 (1982) (suggesting possible application of EC 9-2, enjoining lawyers
to act "in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency
of the legal system and the legal profession"); Devine, supra note 147, at 513-21
(advocating reliance on Model Rule 7.1 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981)).
220. Order ofJuly 2, 1982 (adopted at MO. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 2-101).
221. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final
Draft 1981); note 19 supra. See also In re Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991,
999-1000 (1982) (containing draft rules revised to conform to RMJ).
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advertising rules, which should be studied.2 22 If a similar procedure had been
available to RMJ it might not have been necessary to litigate his case all the
way to the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, if disciplinary pro-
ceedings furnish the only means of testing the rules, there is a chilling ef-
fect. Most lawyers will comply with the rules, valid or not, because they are
unwilling to spend the time and money, and bear the stigma of disciplinary
involvement, simply to test the rules. It is not becoming to disciplinary
authorities or courts to seek to enforce rules that may violate the first amend-
ment through the threat of disciplinary action.
222. See generally Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,
102 S. Ct. 2515 (1982); In re Review of Opinion 475, 89 N.J. 74, 444 A.2d 1092
(1982), appeal dismissedfor want of substantialfederal question, 51 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S.
Nov. 1, 1982) (No. 82-139).
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